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It is submitted that it is. Certainly, "[s] ilence under such cir-
cumstances is not tantamount to creating an exception in a field other-
wise pre-empted by the Congress." 27 Moreover, an interpretation
of the Labor Act provision favoring maximum assumption of juris-
diction by the federal tribunals would have the socially desirable
effect of developing uniform nation-wide standards of permissible
behavior.
M
TORTS-RECOVERY FOR PRENATAL INJuRY.-Plaintiff, born alive
despite negligent injuries sustained during his ninth month en ventre
sa mere, sued for damages.' Defendant moved to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure to state a cause of action. Special Term granted
defendant's motion; the Appellate Division affirmed by a divided
court.2 Held, reversed. When a viable fetus,3 later born alive, has
been negligently injured, a suit for damages will lie.4 Woods v.
Lancet, 303 N. Y. 349, 102 N. E. 2d 691 (1951). 5
Recovery of damages for prenatal injuries was not one of the
common law tort actions.6  It was denied because of the lack of
27 Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, 303 N. Y. 300, 309, 101 N. E. 2d 697, 702
(1951) (dissenting opinion of Dye, J.). For further discussion of the prin-
cipal case, see Petro, The Developing Law, 2 CCH LABOR L. J. 8 (Dec.
1951) (approving the result). But cf. Wilkes Sportswear, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Ladies Garment Workers Union, 29 L. R. R. M. 2300 (1952). See
also Sandier, Minority Picketing for Recognition in New York State, 127
N. Y. L. J. 1094, col. 3 (Mar. 19, 1952).1 The suit was brought in the infant's name by its guardian ad litem.
2 The dissent refused ". . . to do reverence to an outmoded, timeworn fic-
tion not founded on fact and within common knowledge untrue and unjustified."
278 App. Div. 913, 914, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 417, 418 (1st Dep't 1951).
3 ..we confine our holding in this case to prepartum injuries to such
viable children .... This child, when injured, was in fact, alive and capable
of being delivered and of remaining alive, separate from its mother." 303
N. Y. 349, 357, 102 N. E. 2d 691, 695 (1951).
4Judge Lewis dissented, judge Conway joining, on the ground that this
remedy, if granted, should come from the legislature, not from the courts.
5 This writer believes that the Court of Appeals' opinion in the instant
case is so complete that a protracted study of the previous law regarding pre-
natal injuries is unnecessary. The arguments for denying recovery, based on
lack of precedent and on the difficulty of proof, are also covered by the Court.
But the Court expressly refused to deal with the "purely theoretical" objec-
tion that an unborn infant has no existence separate from its mother. "We
need not deal here with so large a subject." This writer believes that the
separate identity of the embryo and fetus should be the only ground for grant-
ing recovery; for that separate entity is a person, and as such should be ac-
corded the protection of tort law.
6Accord, Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884);
cf. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638 (1900); Butler
v. Manhattan Ry., 143 N. Y. 417, 38 N. E. 454 (1894); see 4 RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 869 (1939); Note, 10 A. L. R. 2d 1059, 1060 (1950).
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precedent favoring the suit,7 the almost impossible task of proving
causation,8 and the refusal of the law to recognize the unborn child
as a being separate from its mother.9 Recently, however, a number
of jurisdictions have deviated from prior law, and have allowed the
action.' 0
Absence of precedent is a lame excuse for not redressing an
injury; " and what injury is greater than interference with one's
life and limbs? 12  The law is not static: 13 what the courts have de-
7Ibid.; see Note, [1951] WASH. U. L. Q. 408, 412. Absence of a statute
authorizing recovery has been the reason for numerous decisions. See Scott
v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P. 2d 678, hearing denied, 33 Cal. App.
2d 629, 93 P. 2d 562 (1939) ; Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A. 2d
28 (1940); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D. D. C. 1946); 43 C. J. S.,
Infants § 104 (1945).
8 Accord, Drobner v. Peters, 232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567 (1921); see
PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 189 (1941) ; Note, 10 A. L. R. 2d
1059, 1062 (1950); Note, [1951] WASH. U. L. Q. 408, 410.
9 "In the mother's womb he had no separate existence of his own. When
born he became a person .... His full rights as a human being sprang into
existence with his birth." Drobner v. Peters, 232 N. Y. 220, 223, 133 N. E.
567, 568 (1921) ; accord, In re Roberts' Estate, 158 Misc. 698, 286 N. Y. Supp.
476 (Surr. Ct. 1936); cf. Witrak v. Nassau Electric R. R., 52 App. Div. 234,
65 N. Y. Supp. 257 (2d Dep't 1900); Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d
629, 92 P. 2d 678, 680, hearing denied, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 93 P. 2d 562
(1939) ; Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N. E.
2d 334 (1949); Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., 154 App. Div. 667,
672, 139 N. Y. Supp. 367, 370 (2d Dep't 1913); see Collins, May Parents
Maintain an Action for the Wrongful Death of an Unborn Child in Missouri
-the Case Against the Right of Action, 15 Mo. L. REv. 230, 232 et seq. (1950) ;
15 HARv. L. REv. 344, 345 (1932) ("Such a theory seems preferable as it
eliminates any fiction of according an embryo personality and avoids the
medico-metaphysical controversy as to when a child is in esse."). According
to a philosophical concept prevalent during the twelfth to fifteenth centuries,
the human substantial form is infused into the embryo at some time between
conception and birth. O'MALLEY, THE ETHICS OF MEDIcAL HOMICIDE AND
MUTrLATIoN 35 (1922). Contemporary medicine considered the mother and
her unborn infant as one being. It is quite probable that the judges who for-
mulated the early common law were influenced by these theories, with the legal
effect that they fixed birth as the arbitrary moment at which to confer on the
child the protection of the law. But see note 32 infra.
10 See Scott v. McPheeters, supra note 9; Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael
& Sons, 208 Ga. 201, 65 S. E. 2d 909 (1951) ; Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 79 A.
2d 550 (Md. 1951); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N. W. 2d 838
(1949); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., supra note 9; Bonbrest v.
Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D. D. C. 1946); Montreal Tramways v. Leveille,
[1933] 4 D. L. R. 337.
I "The argument from lack of precedent is obviously the least substantial.
The common law does not go on the theory that a case of first impression
presents a problem of legislative as opposed to judicial power. This argument
merits no further comment." 1935 REPORT, N. Y. LAw REV IsIo Commissioe
449, 465; cf. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D. D. C. 1946); see
Woods v. Lancet, 278 App. Div. 913, 914, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 417, 418 (1st Dep't
1951) (dissenting opinion) (". . . an adjudicated case is not indispensable to
establish a right to recover under the rules of the common law.").
3. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D. D. C. 1946); see Note, 10
A. L. R. 2d 1059, 1071 (1950).
13 Woods v. Lancet, 278 App. Div. 913, 914, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 417, 418 (1st
1952 ]
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creed as a rule, they can modify or abrogate.14  Nor should the diffi-
culty of proof serve to deny the action; 15 for the court sets the
standard of proof, and the plaintiff must meet it, or fail.1 6
Perhaps the greatest hurdle to allowing recovery for prenatal
injuries was the tort-law concept of the fetus as part of the mother-
not a separate entity until after birth.17  Both the criminal law and
the law of property considered the unborn infant as distinct from the
mother, so as to punish those who procured its destruction,18 as well
as to accord certain rights to it."9 It would be anomalous if the law
were protecting a nonentity from criminals but not from tortfeasors,20
Dep't 1951) (dissenting opinion); see 1935 REPORT, N. Y. LAW REVISION
CommissioN 449, 465.
14Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371 (1933); Klein v. Maravelas,
219 N. Y. 383, 114 N. E. 809 (1916); cf. Hagopian v. Samuelson, 236 App.
Div. 491, 492, 260 N. Y. Supp. 24, 26 (1st Dep't 1932) ; see 1935 REPoRT, N. Y.
LAW REVnsioN CommissioN 449, 465.
25 "In my view, justice should not be turned aside and wrongs go without
remedies because of apprehension of what may happen in jurisprudence if it
be decided that an unborn child has some rights of the person." Nugent v.
Brooklyn Heights R. R., 154 App. Div. 667, 672, 139 N. Y. Supp. 367, 371
(2d Dep't 1913) ; cf. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D. D. C. 1946);
see Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N. J. L. 455, 26 A. 2d 489, 687 (1942) (dissenting
opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Brogan); see 1935 REPORT, N. Y. LAW REvisioN
CommIssIoN 449, 474; Note, [1951] WASH. U. L. Q. 408, 423, 426; 7 CORNELL
L. Q. 275 (1922).
16 "When the absence of other possible known causes is affirnatively shown,
then the fact that unknown causes may be in operation should not preclude the
judge from permitting the jury to find a causal connection." Note, [1951]
WAsH. U. L. Q. 408, 423; see 1935 REPORT, N. Y. LAW REvisION CommissioN
449, 474; Note, 3 VAND. L. RFv. 282, 292 (1950) ("There would seem to be
no reason why substantial justice cold not be done by the strict application
of rules of evidence and scientifically enlightened control by the courts.").
17 See note 9 supra. But cf. Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92
P. 2d 678, hearing denied, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 93 P. 2d 562 (1939) ; Williams
v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N. E. 2d 334 (1949) ; see
43 C. J. S. 747 (1945).
18 "For if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion or otherwise killeth
it in her womb; or if anyone beat her, whereby the child dieth in her body,
and she is delivered of a dead child; this, though not murder, was by the an-
cient law homicide or manslaughter." 1 BL. CoMm. *129. See N. Y. PENAL
LAw §§ 80-82, 1050, 1052, 240, 482(2), 483, 492, 2461.
19 "By a legal fiction or indulgence, a legal personality is imputed to an
unborn child as a rule of property for all purposes beneficial to the infant after
his birth. . . ." Drobner v. Peters, 232 N. Y. 220, 222, 133 N. E. 567, 568
(1921); see 1 BL. Comm. *130; 27 Am. Jur. 747 (1940).
20,"It is quite difficult to reconcile the rule of recognition of a separate
existence of a child in order to punish crime committed against it with com-
plete rejection of such rule in a civil suit by the child to secure redress for a
physical injury." Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114,
87 N. E. 2d 334, 336 (1949); cf. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 141
(D. D. C. 1946); see Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N. J. L. 455, 26 A. 2d 489, 686
(1942) (dissenting opinion) ("If such unborn child is to be regarded as a
non-entity, actually or legally, why may it not at the common law be destroyed




or according rights to a fictitious being, so as to preserve those rights,
without protecting their owner.21
Blackstone said that life begins legally when the fetus stirs; 22
and, following this reasoning, the minority rule today limits recovery
for prenatal injury to cases wherein the fetus was viable at the time
of the injury. 23 This is based on the hypothesis that the fetus is a
separate entity when it is able to live outside its mother.24  Such is
not the medical fact, for a dependence of one upon another does not
make the two one.25 Medical authorities have long since described
21 "All that need be said here is that recognition of property rights in the
unborn infant but a denial of the more substantial privilege of seeking to re-
cover for injuries wrongfully inflicted, indicates a lack of a sense of propor-
tion." 1935 REPORT, N. Y. LAW RmsION CommIssioN 449, 466; see Stemmer
v. Kline, 128 N. J. L. 455, 26 A. 2d 489, 686 (1942) (dissenting opinion);
Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., 154 App. Div. 667, 669, 139 N. Y. Supp.
367, 369, 370 (2d Dep't 1913). "The being that owns is the supreme consid-
eration and has capacity for ownership. What is owned and the right to own
are merely incidental to the living entity... , And yet shall the incidents be
valued in legal cognizance and the owner not? . . . It is not helpful to char-
acterize its existence as fictitious as to property rights. The rights are ac-
corded to it." Ibid. See 72 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 455, 456 (1924) ("To say that
the child had a separate existence by a 'legal fiction' is to admit that he does
not have an actual existence in law, and to assume that he does not have it in
fact. This is nothing more nor less than judicial legislation in a somewhat
veiled form."); Note, [1951] WAsH. U. L. Q. 408, 416 ("Such a problem is
not solved by adroit statements that the plaintiff was or was not a legal person.
Such a statement is nothing more than a verbalization of an otherwise reached
conclusion, i.e., that plaintiff may not recover from defendant."); Note, 10
A. L. R. 2d 1059, 1071 (1950).
22 "Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every
individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able
to stir in the mother's womb." 1 BL Comm. *129.
23 "The law should, it seems to me, be that whenever a child in utero is
so far advanced in prenatal age as that, should parturition by natural or arti-
ficial means occur at such age, such child could and would live separable from
the mother, and grow into the ordinary activities of life, and is afterwards
born, and becomes a living human being, such child has a right of action for
any injuries wantonly or negligently inflicted upon his or her person at such
age of viability, though then in the womb of the mother." Allaire v. St. Luke's
Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638, 642 (1900) (dissenting opinion) ; see Scott
v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P. 2d 678, hearing denied, 33 Cal. App.
2d 629, 93 P. 2d 562 (1939); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152
Ohio St. 114, 87 N. E. 2d 334 (1949); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138(D. D. C. 1946) ; Note, 10 A. L. R. 2d 1059. 1065 (1950) ; Cason, M1ay Parents
Maintain an Action for the Wrongful Death of an Unborn Child in Missouri
-The Case for the Right of Action, 15 Mo. L. Rxv. 212, 218 (1950) (Fetus
is generally deemed viable between sixth and seventh month of pregnancy.).
24 Ibid. But cf. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D. D. C. 1946).
"Every human embryo is possessed of as effects within a cause of all of the
sentient, vegetative and spiritual (the latter term used in opposition to the
former) qualities of an adult, subject, of course, to the later influence of en-
vironment and education." Id. at 141, n. 13.
25 No sane person would assert that a man and the tapeworm within him
are one and the same being; yet that is exactly what is said of the mother
and the embryo she bears. See Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N. J. L. 455, 26 A. 2d
1952 ]
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the embryo as a separate entity from the time of its conception: 26
it moves about and grows in a very determined manner unregulated
by the mother's desires on the subject.2 7 The fact that it is attached
to the mother does not make the embryo similar to her finger, since
neither the parent's blood nor her nerves pass into or through the
child 2 8-indeed, the presence of maternal blood in the embryo is in-
dicative of an abnormal condition.2 9  Thus the prenatal infant can-
not be said to be a part of the mother, although it is within, attached
to and dependent upon her.30 For courts to rule as a matter of law
that separate existence begins either at birth or at viability is dis,
regarding the facts,31 and ". . . hanging a legal conclusion on an
obviously incorrect statement of medical science." 32
Once the embryo is deemed a person, the duty of care toward it
follows as a conclusion.3 3  It would not be unreasonable to require
a greater degree of care towards a possibly-pregnant woman,34 and
489, 687 (1942) (dissenting opinion) ("While it is a fact that there is a close
dependence by the unborn child on the organism of the mother, it is not dis-
puted today that the mother and the child are two separate and distinct
entities. .. .") ; Cason, supra note 23, at 221 ("Dependency of one upon an-
other for sustenance can hardly be said to make the one a part of the other.").
2650 MICH. L. REv. 166 (1951); see 27 Am. Jur. 747 (1940); KEITH,
IUMAN EMBRYOLOGY AND MORPHOLOGY 1-21 (1921).
27 See I MANUAL OF HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 21-42, 59-90 (Kiebel and Mall
ed. 1910); KEITH, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY AND MORPHOLOGY 1-21 (1921); AREY,
DEVELOPMENTAL ANATOMY 90, 91 (4th rev. ed. 1940); BAILEY & M.LLEa,
TExT-BOOK OF EMBRYOLOGY 611 (5th rev. ed. 1929).
28 KEITH, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY AND MORPHOLOGY 23 et seq. (1921) ; BAILEY
& MILLER, TEXT-BooR OF EMBRYOLOGY 623 (5th rev. ed. 1929); SCHENFIMLD,
YOU AND HEREDITY 32, 33 (1939) (quoted in Cason, supra note 23, at 218).
29 1 MANUAL OF HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 21 (Keibel and Mall ed. 1910) ; see
AREY, DEVELOPMENTAL ANATOMY 306-8 (4th rev. ed. 1940).
30 See note 25 supra; BAILEY & MILLER, TExT-BooK OF EMBRYOLOGY 607
(5th rev. ed. 1929) ; Cason, suprta note 23, at 220.
31 "From the very moment of conception, the infant develops its own per-
sonality. The fact is that the infant lives with its mother while in its pre-
natal state, rather than being a 'part of the mother,' as contended in the
Dietrich case." Comment, [1951] Wis. L. REv. 518, 524; see 72 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 455, 456 (1924).
32 "To deny that an unborn child is a separate entity before birth is to
deny a medical fact. Certainly no clarity can be introduced into the problem
by hanging a legal conclusion on an obviously incorrect statement of medical
science." 1935 REPORT, N. Y. LAw RmsION COMMISSION 449, 472. Modern
philosophers argue that the human substantial form-that vital principle which
distinguishes man as a distinct species--exists in the embryo from conception.
O'MALLEY, op. cit. supra note 9, at 61, 62. Therefore, as both the medical and
the philosophical backgrounds of the common law rule have changed, it is
time that the law based on those ideas should be changed to conform to the
true state of science and philosophy today-by granting an infant the rights of
a person from conception.
33 Cason, supra note 23, at 224.
34 Note, [1951] WASH. U. L. Q. 408, 416, 417. But see Nugent v. Brooklyn
Heights R. R., 154 App. Div. 667, 673, 139 N. Y. Supp. 367, 371 (2d Dep't
1913).
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to include the unborn child within that group whose possible injury
can be reasonably foreseen.35
Having granted the child redress for prenatal injuries, a cause
of action for its wrongful death 6 would seem to follow, since the
denial of that action was based on the denial of the child's recovery
in its own name. 7 The instant case, however, did not concern a
wrongful death action; but sufficiently justified its place in legal
annals by overthrowing the throttling grip of precedent and afford-
ing partial justice to children negligently injured before birth.
x
TORTS-RIGHT OF UNEMANCIPATED MINOR TO SUE PARENT IN
BUSINESS CAPACITY.- Plaintiff, an unemancipated minor, sought
damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by the negligent main-
tenance of a gasoline pump. The defendant, a partnership composed
of plaintiff's father and another, moved for judgment on the plead-
ings, contending that a minor child could not sue a firm in which his
parent was a partner. Held, motion denied. An unemancipated in-
fant can sue its parent in his business capacity for damages for per-
sonal injuries caused by negligence. Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St.
566, 103 N. E. 2d 743 (1952).
The common law rule, followed by the majority of American
jurisdictions, denies the minor child a cause of action in tort against
its parent.' The rationale is that allowing such suits will disrupt the
family harmony,2 impair parental discipline,3 and deplete the family
exchequer.4
35 See Ehret v. Village of Scarsdale, 269 N. Y. 198, 199 N. E. 56 (1935);
Palsgraf v. Long Island R R., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).36 N. Y. DECEDENT EsTATE LAW § 130. But see Laws of N. Y. 1847, c.
450 (the 1847 statute refers to "person," while the present one applies to a
"decedent").
3 In re Roberts' Estate, 158 Misc. 698, 286 N. Y. Supp. 476 (Surr. Ct.
1936); see 16 Am. Jur. 56 (1938); 25 C. J. S. 1087, 1091, 1093 (1941). But
cf. Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. 1933) ; Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio
St. 529, 92 N. E. 2d 809 (1950); see 1935 REI'oRTr, N. Y. LAW REvIsior
ComiIsSl Io 449, 471, 473; Cason, supra note 23, at 212.
"Accord, Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N. Y. 425, 40 N. E. 2d 236 (1942) ; see
Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N. Y. 106, 110, 22 N. E. 2d 254, 256 (1939); Cowgill v.
Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P. 2d 445, 453 (1950) ; Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278,
95 N. W. 640, 642 (1903); see MADDEN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PEr.soNs
AND Do~mEsnc RELATIoNs 449 (1931).2 Accord, Krohngold v. Krohngold, 181 N. E. 910 (Ohio App. 1932) ; see
Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S. E. 708, 710 (1932); Canen v. Kraft,
41 Ohio App. 120, 180 N. E. 277, 278 (1931).8 See Buchanan v. Buchanan, 170 Va. 458, 197 S. E. 426, 432 (1938) ; see
PROssEa, LAW OF ToRTs 906 (1941).
4 Accord, Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12, 15 (1923);
Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787 (1927) ; see McCurdy, Torts Be-
1952 ]
